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Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008)
Jane S. Jaquette y Abraham F. Lowenthal*
Samuel Phillips Huntington, who 
passed away on December 24, 2008, 
was the most influential U.S. political 
scientist and one of the world’s most 
prominent public intellectuals of the 
past fifty years.
Unlike his two early contemporaries 
on the Harvard University faculty, 
Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski, Huntington did not leave academia 
for the policy-making world. Except for 
two years (1977-78) in the Carter Ad-
ministration’s National Security Coun-
cil staff (at Brzezinski’s invitation), 
Huntington remained essentially a 
scholar. He occasionally offered advice 
directly to public officials, including to 
the U.S. government in the 1960s on 
how to build civic support in Vietnam, 
and to Brazil’s military government in 
the 1970s on how to liberalize gradu-
ally and open the way back toward 
civilian government. But Samuel Hun-
tington’s main contribution was as an 
analyst, writer and teacher, not as a 
policy maker or policy advisor.
During each of the last six decades, 
beginning with his classic The Soldier 
and the State in 1957, Huntington 
repeatedly framed the academic and 
sometimes the broader debate on an 
astounding variety of issues: civil-
military relations; the political culture 
and institutions of the United States; the 
weaknesses of modernization theory; 
the sources and dynamics of the «third 
wave» of democratization; the likeli-
hood of a post-Cold War «clash of 
civilizations»; the impact of Hispanic 
immigration on American identity and 
influence; and the central importance 
of political institutions as well as the 
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significance of deep culture and of 
personal leadership.
On each of these diverse topics, Hun-
tington’s arguments remain at the heart 
of scholarly, political and policy dis-
course. Some of his perceptive insights 
and theoretical frameworks continue 
to illuminate complex questions; others 
have been challenged and even discred-
ited. But no one can deny the tower-
ing presence of Samuel Huntington: 
consistently able to define and attract 
attention to important questions; draw 
evidence from a broad knowledge of 
relevant theories and comparative data; 
couch his arguments in clear and often 
arresting prose; challenge conventional 
views; train numerous leading scholars 
and professionals; and direct research 
centers and notable journals. Hunting-
ton moved from subject to subject with-
out tiresome repetition or the recourse 
to exclusionary jargon to which many 
social scientists succumb. His penchant 
for big topics, his capacity for compara-
tive analysis, and his lucid prose made 
Samuel Huntington obligatory reading 
for three generations of students and 
scholars and for an increasingly broad 
range of others, in the United States and 
throughout the world. 
Huntington wrote, co-authored, 
edited or co-edited nineteen volumes 
and numerous scholarly articles. A new 
edition (the fifteenth) of The Soldier and 
the State was published in August 2008. 
His most widely discussed work, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remak-
ing of the World Order (1996) became 
a major best-seller worldwide, appear-
ing in many editions and languages. 
His 1993 Foreign Affairs article «The 
Clash of Civilizations?» introducing 
his predictions that the post Cold War 
world would be less about ideological 
or economic conflict and more about 
civilizational rivalry, has been trans-
lated and debated on every continent 
save Antarctica.
Five seminal works
Time and space considerations 
require us to focus here on but five 
of Huntington’s volumes: Political 
Order in Changing Societies (1968); 
American Politics: The Promise of 
Disharmony (1981); The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (1991); The Clash of Civiliza-
tions and the Remaking of the World 
Order (1996); and Who Are We? The 
Challenge to America’s International 
Identity (2004), his final and in many 
ways least satisfactory book. 
Political Order in Changing Societ-
ies was Huntington’s most powerful, 
original and theoretical work, and 
his most enduringly influential in the 
academic literature. Wading into the 
strong current of optimistic accounts 
of modernization and of economic and 
political change both in Latin America 
and in the newly independent former 
colonial countries, Huntington chal-
lenged the prevailing assumptions and 
arguments. His opening paragraphs, 
starkly presenting his fundamental 
position, deserve quotation:
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The most important political dis-
tinction among countries concerns not 
their form of government but their 
degree of government. The differences 
between democracy and dictatorship 
are less than the differences between 
those countries whose politics embo-
dies consensus, community, legitimacy, 
organization, effectiveness, stability, 
and those countries whose politics is 
deficient in those qualities. Communist 
totalitarian states and Western liberal 
states both belong generally in the 
category of effective rather than debile 
political systems. The United States, 
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union 
have different forms of government, but 
in all three systems the government go-
verns… These governments command 
the loyalties of their citizens and thus 
have the capacity to tax resources, to 
conscript manpower, and to innovate 
and to execute policy. In all these cha-
racteristics, the political systems of the 
United States, Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union differ significantly from 
the governments which exist in many, if 
not most, of the modernizing countries 
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
Having unflinchingly characterized 
the violent and unstable politics that 
dominated most of the developing 
world, Huntington set out to analyze 
and explain such political decay and the 
requisites of political order; to explore 
why it had been so difficult for West-
ern social scientists to recognize and 
deal with these issues; and to advance 
practical ideas about what could and 
should be done.
An astoundingly broad and eclectic 
range of sources, methods and data 
informs Political Order. In the first 
chapter alone, Huntington draws on 
citations from anthropology, econom-
ics, history, law, political science, public 
administration and sociology as well 
as from a contemporary novel. He 
cites such classic authors as Aristotle, 
Plato, Plutarch, Machiavelli, Hob-
bes, Gibbons, Burke, Tocqueville and 
Sarmiento. But he also draws on four 
unpublished doctoral dissertations and 
a Master’s thesis; on numerous country 
and area study specialists on and from 
countries all over the world; and on 
more than forty major contemporary 
social scientists.
Huntington’s fundamental thesis—
developed and presented with an ef-
fective combination of analytic logic, 
historical evidence and comparative 
insight—was that rapid social change 
and the consequent mobilization of new 
groups into politics often outpaced the 
development of political institutions 
able to process their participation and 
demands. When the rates of social mo-
bilization and the expansion of political 
participation are high and the levels 
of political organization and political 
institutionalization are low, the result is 
political instability and disorder.
Because of the history of the United 
States, American social scientists and 
policy makers tend to think, not about 
the creation of authority and the ac-
cumulation of power, but rather about 
limiting authority and dividing power. 
They concentrate, therefore, on assur-
ing free and fair elections, without real-
izing that «elections to be meaningful 
presuppose a certain level of political 
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organization… The problem is not to 
hold elections but to create organiza-
tions… Authority has to exist before it 
can be limited.»
Starting with these compelling ob-
servations, Huntington analyzed the 
prerequisites of authority and effective 
government at different levels of mo-
bilization, participation, and institu-
tional development. He systematically 
refuted various optimistic assumptions 
and hypotheses of the modernization 
literature about the process that, until 
Huntington’s critique, had generally 
been conceived in teleological terms 
as «political development.» He substi-
tuted a theory based on the changing 
relationship between political participa-
tion and political institutionalization 
and applied his theory to traditional, 
modernizing and modern societies 
in many regions of the world. He 
developed general propositions that 
illuminated and explained many cases 
previously thought of as idiosyncratic 
or even inexplicable, cast doubt on the 
direction of change, and focused on the 
sources of authority and order.
Of particular utility was his origi-
nal discussion of military intervention 
in politics, arguing that its important 
causes were not the social and orga-
nizational characteristics of the armed 
forces, but the political and institutional 
structure of the society. The reason mili-
tary explanations do not explain mili-
tary interventions, Huntington argued, 
is that military interventions are only 
one specific manifestation of a broader 
phenomenon: the politicization of so-
cial forces and institutions.»Countries 
that have political armies also have 
political clergies, political universities, 
political bureaucracies, political labor 
unions, and political corporations… 
What makes such groups politicized is 
the absence of effective political insti-
tutions capable of mediating, refining, 
and moderating political action.» 
In such situations, which Hunting-
ton terms «praetorian,» social forces 
confront each other nakedly. «No 
political institution, no corps of profes-
sional political leaders are recognized 
and accepted as the legitimate inter-
mediaries to mediate group conflict. 
Equally important, no agreement exists 
among the groups as to the legitimate 
and authoritative methods for resolving 
conflicts.» In both Western constitu-
tional democracies and communist dic-
tatorships, there is general agreement 
on the means for allocating offices, 
distributing power, and resolving dis-
putes, but this is not so in a praetorian 
society where «each group employs the 
means which reflect its peculiar nature 
and capabilities.» 
Political Order in Changing Societ-
ies presents tightly reasoned and highly 
nuanced analysis for 461 pages, and 
includes too many important ideas to 
be summarized here. Of special inter-
est, for example, is his discussion of 
the possibility of revolution in a deeply 
praetorian society: 
In the normal polity the conser-
vative is devoted to stability and the 
preservation of order, while the radical 
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threatens these with abrupt and violent 
change. But what meaning do concepts 
of conservatism and radicalism have in a 
completely chaotic society where order 
must be created through a positive act 
of political will? In such a society who 
then is the radical? Who is the conser-
vative? Is not the only true conservative 
the revolutionary?
But true revolution is difficult and 
rare, Huntington goes on to point out, 
and its results are not always positive 
or permanent. True reform, however, 
is even rarer, and in some ways even 
more difficult, he says in introducing 
Chapter 6, on «Reform and Political 
Change,» a brilliantly comparative, 
practical and constructive discussion 
of reform-mongering and the central 
importance of building civic organiza-
tions and political parties. Chapter 7 
focuses sharply on political parties, and 
has not since been improved upon as a 
statement of the indispensable need for 
political organization as the foundation 
for political stability and the precondi-
tion of political liberty. «The vacuum 
of power and authority which exists 
in so many modernizing countries may 
be filled temporarily with charismatic 
leadership or by military force. But 
it can be filled permanently only by 
political organization… In the modern-
izing world he controls the future who 
organizes its politics.» These are still 
important truths.
American Politics: The Promise 
of Disharmony (1981) was in effect 
Huntington’s response to the tumultu-
ous events in the United States during 
the late 1960s. Characteristically, he 
sought to counter the polarized argu-
ments about this period by putting it 
in historical perspective. He countered 
those on the left, who hoped the civil 
rights and anti-war movements and 
changes in mores and attitudes might 
add up to revolutionary change. But 
he also answered those on the right 
who feared that the radical claims and 
sometimes violent tactics of student 
rebels marked a serious rupture in 
American political culture. Huntington 
instead found important similarities 
between the 1960s and prior outbursts 
of «creedal passion.» The driving force 
behind these recurrent eruptions was 
not a revolutionary impulse, Hunting-
ton maintained, but a renewed public 
awareness of the gap between American 
ideals and American political realities. 
The struggles of the 1960s did not 
involve conflicts between «partisans 
of different principles, but a reaffirma-
tion of traditional American ideals and 
values; they were a time of comparing 
practice to principle, of reality to ideal, 
of behavior to belief.» Sit-ins, boycotts 
and marches focused on Jim Crow and 
black disenfranchisement, «that area of 
American life where the gap between 
ideal and reality was most obvious and 
blatant.» 
Huntington labeled the ideal the 
«American Creed,» and defined it as 
a broad consensus on values that are 
«liberal, individualistic, democratic, 
[and] egalitarian,» and essentially 
«antigovernment and antiauthority in 
character.» Popular awareness of the 
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gap between institutions and ideals 
usually remains latent in American poli-
tics. But at certain moments it can rise 
to the surface, challenging established 
institutions and existing practices, 
Huntington argues, as it did in the 
«Revolutionary era of the 1760s and 
1770s, the Jacksonian age of the 1820s 
and 1830s, and the Populist-Progressive 
years of the 1890s and the 1900s.» 
Huntington contrasted his argument 
with three paradigms that have been 
used to interpret American politics. The 
«progressive» approach emphasizes 
class relations and class conflict, find-
ing the United States similar to Europe 
rather than exceptional. The «consen-
sus» model, exemplified by Tocqueville 
and especially Louis Hartz, argues that 
the abundance of land and opportuni-
ties for social mobility explains why the 
United States lacked «both feudalism 
and socialism.» The «pluralist» inter-
pretation describes US politics as a com-
petition among interest groups. Each 
paradigm uses social structures and 
economic interests to explain American 
politics, Huntington noted, with the 
pluralist and class conflict theorists see-
ing perpetual competition over «grubby 
materialistic interests» while consensus 
theory «reduces it all to placid harmony 
and dullness.» Huntington thought that 
all three frameworks were too static, 
however, and that they missed the im-
portance of political ideas in American 
politics. «America has been spared 
class conflicts in order to have moral 
convulsions,» he wrote, because its 
social and political inequalities contrast 
with a moral environment committed 
to equality. 
To Huntington, the American Creed 
was the bedrock of American national 
identity. Some countries, like China, 
have a «monism» of both ideology and 
nationality, and others, such as France 
and Italy, have ideological competition 
but a single nationality. «The United 
States, on the other hand, is composed, 
apart from the Indian tribes, not of 
nationalities but of ethnic groups.» 
These have not fully assimilated «into 
the culture and community of the 
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants» nor 
intermarried to create a new American 
«race,» but became American precisely 
by accepting «American political val-
ues, ideals and symbols.» If that were 
to change, «America» would no longer 
exist.
Periodically, however, the gap be-
tween American ideals and American 
practices goes from being denied, ig-
nored, or cynically accepted to become 
the central issue. Complacency shifts to 
self-criticism. The gap between ideals 
and reality can also produce a politics 
prone to political distortions: belief in 
conspiracy theories, excessive govern-
ment secrecy, or a tendency to put too 
much trust in individual politicians 
simply because they seem «sincere.» In 
addition to the civil rights movement, 
the domestic turmoil over the Vietnam 
war fit Huntington’s theoretical frame-
work. The contrast between periods of 
creedal passivity and creedal passion 
make periods of moral awakening seem 
apocryphal and violent, Huntington 
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argued, with attacks on authority and 
calls for institutional change. As the 
United States became a more powerful 
global actor, its foreign policy (which 
is realist and therefore constrained in 
many of its goals and practices) was 
increasingly vulnerable to the charge 
that it was not consistent with Ameri-
can ideals. 
To those who thought US policy 
should try to address this by reduc-
ing «the gap between other people’s 
institutions and American values,» 
Huntington cautioned that this is far 
from easy for four reasons. First, «to 
intrude from outside is imperialism 
or colonialism.» Second, the task is 
«simply beyond American knowledge, 
skill, and resources.» Third, such inter-
ventions «needlessly antagonize» other 
governments. Fourth, doing so «poses 
dangers to the operation of democratic 
government within the United States.» 
In retrospect, as one reflects on a se-
ries of unfortunate US involvements 
abroad, these concerns seem remark-
able prescient and wise. They fore-
shadow Huntingon’s own opposition 
to the Iraq invasion in 2003.
Huntington acknowledged that 
strong arguments could be made in 
favor of US international activism: US 
intervention might be justified if the 
institutions of another country «pose 
a direct threat» to the United States, or 
such intervention is supported by the 
population of another country or oc-
curs to promote universally-held values. 
Or, it could be argued that the world is 
becoming so interdependent that it can-
not contain competing systems without 
danger to the survival of liberal values. 
Choosing between these arguments for 
and against U.S. intervention abroad 
was not a matter of first principle for 
Huntington but of carefully balancing 
benefits and costs, potential gains and 
risks, with a bias toward prudence.
The charge from the 1960s that 
most nettled Huntington was that the 
United States, and US foreign policy 
in particular, was guilty of hypocrisy. 
He countered that those who support 
leftist movements are not necessar-
ily supporting individual rights and 
freedoms because «the suppression of 
liberty in right-wing dictatorships is 
almost always less pervasive than it is 
in left wing totalitarian ones.» Contrary 
to both the «realists» and the «moral-
ists,» Huntington declared that the 
contradiction arising from America’s 
role in the world «is not primarily that 
of power and self-interest versus liberty 
and morality…but between enhancing 
liberty at home by curbing the power of 
the American government and enhanc-
ing liberty abroad by expanding that 
power.» Managing this tension is not 
easy, but is important. 
Huntington concludes that the 
1960s left the United States «with a 
more equitable society» and «a more 
open politics,» but also with «a more 
cynical public and a less authoritative 
and effective government;» in other 
words, participation had increased, 
but institutionalization had weakened. 
Huntington ultimately put his faith, 
however, in the American Creed: «Crit-
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ics say that America is a lie because its 
reality falls so far short of its ideals. 
They are wrong. America is not a lie; 
it is a disappointment. But it can be a 
disappointment only because it is also 
a hope.» 
Ten years later, in 1991, Huntington 
published The Third Wave: Democra-
tization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Impressed by the advances toward dem-
ocratic governance in thirty countries 
in less than twenty years, Huntington 
underlined that democracy is not only 
«good in itself,» but also has «positive 
consequences for individual freedom, 
domestic stability, international peace, 
and the United States of America.» 
The Third Wave begins with an 
account of a military coup—the 1974 
overthrow of the Portuguese dictator, 
Marcello Caetano—that «implausibly 
and unwittingly» began a trend toward 
democratization, first in Southern Eu-
rope, then in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe, and eventually in several coun-
tries in Asia and Africa. The events that 
led to democracy in Portugal set off a 
series of transitions from authoritarian-
ism that Huntington called the «Third 
Wave,» a label that stuck, like so many 
of Huntington’s pithy phrases. Offer-
ing a post hoc analysis of the events 
and actions that might explain the 
surprising turn, Huntington concluded 
that «no single factor is sufficient» to 
explain why democracy developed «in 
all countries or in a single country,» and 
that «no single factor’ is necessary to its 
development in all countries. Economic 
growth is critical, to produce a more 
highly educated public and a larger 
middle class, which may facilitate a 
civic culture of trust and a demand for 
institutional competence, but these do 
not automatically lead to democratic 
transitions.
External factors were important 
in reinforcing the Third Wave, Hun-
tington argued. Increasing US support 
for democratic governments under 
the Carter and eventually the Reagan 
administrations and the impact of the 
Second Vatican Council (1962-65) 
made a difference in Southern Europe 
and Latin America, while the Helsinki 
Process and the role of the European 
Community helped promote transi-
tions from authoritarianism in Eastern 
and Central Europe. But, Huntington 
insisted, external forces can only help 
push forward or retard democratiza-
tion processes that are occurring within 
countries. Local leadership is critical. 
The third wave would not have been 
as successful had the international en-
vironment been less favorable, but «a 
democratic regime is installed not by 
trends but by people….Political leaders 
and publics have to act.»
Huntington’s historical perspective 
led him to caution that the Third Wave 
might be reversible, as earlier periods 
of democratization (from 1828 to 1926 
and 1943 to 1962) had been followed 
by «reverse waves» of authoritarian or 
even totalitarian rule. Democratization 
could shift into reverse under several 
conditions: if democracies showed a 
«sustained inability to provide welfare, 
prosperity, equity, justice, domestic 
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order, or internal security»; or if there 
were a general economic collapse, on 
the order of the Great Depression. If an 
authoritarian government proved itself 
better able to address problems of se-
curity or economic growth or «greatly 
expanded its power,» a «snowballing 
effect» might occur, fueling the rise of 
«authoritarian nationalism.»
Countries that had adopted de-
mocracy but lacked the economic and 
prerequisites needed to sustain it were 
especially vulnerable. Anticipating 
democratic «disenchantment,» Hun-
tington predicted that «as authoritarian 
failures fade, irritation with democratic 
failures is likely to increase.» Several 
types of authoritarianism might emerge 
in such a reverse wave, from old fash-
ioned oligarchic authoritarianism to 
preserve the wealth and power of the 
elites, to populist dictatorships, to au-
thoritarian regimes based on religious 
fundamentalism or ethnic communal-
ism. Consolidation would depend on 
whether the new regimes maintained 
their legitimacy, suggesting a series of 
problems that the newly established 
regimes would have to recognize and 
confront. These ranged from how the 
transitions were carried out; whether 
anti-democratic officials and leaders 
can be «weeded out» or marginalized; 
managing the role of the military; and 
the tendency, once democratic gover-
nance becomes the «norm,» toward 
an overdependence on performance 
measures. Huntington then turned to 
the problem of how to deal with those 
who were torturers under the authori-
tarian regimes, concluding that «the 
least unsatisfactory course may be: do 
not prosecute, do not punish, do not 
forgive, and, above all, do not forget,» 
advice consistent with the combination 
of amnesties and truth commissions 
that were widely adopted in several 
countries during the 1990s. 
In the preface to The Third Wave, 
Huntington says that in his earlier 
books he tried to «develop generaliza-
tions or theories about the relations 
between key variables, such as political 
power and military professionalism, 
political participation and political 
institutionalization, and political ideals 
and political behavior.» In The Third 
Wave, however, he would limit his 
analysis to «a discrete class of events.» 
He continued to reflect on the role of 
leadership and institutions, but also 
introduced culture as an important 
variable. Citing George Kennan’s view 
that modern democracies emerged in 
a Northern European cultural setting 
and may not be «the natural form of 
rule for peoples outside those narrow 
perimeters,» Huntington proposes 
that the «Western culture thesis» has 
«immediate implications for democra-
tization in the Balkans and the Soviet 
Union,» where Orthodox and Islamic 
religious beliefs are remain dominant. 
Lacking the «Western experiences with 
feudalism, the Renaissance, the Refor-
mation, the Enlightenment, the French 
Revolution, and liberalism,» Hun-
tington predicts that these countries 
will face great difficulties in adopting 
democratic institutions and that democ-
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ratization will be least likely to succeed 
in countries with cultural traditions 
that are hostile to democracy, notably 
Confucianism and Islam. 
Culture is at the very heart of Hun-
tington’s next book, The Clash of Civi-
lizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (1996). First advanced in 1993 
in Foreign Affairs, Huntington’s cen-
tral thesis is that the world, no longer 
divided into a bipolar confrontation 
between two ideologies and two eco-
nomic systems, is becoming a multi-
polar world of blocs. These would not 
be economic blocs as many were then 
predicting, however, but rather compet-
ing «civilizations.» Huntington’s thesis 
was originally greeted with considerable 
skepticism by scholars, but after the 
events of September 11, 2001, his article 
and book received new attention, and 
Huntington was hailed, especially by the 
media and pundits, as prescient. 
In making his case, Huntington took 
as his starting point two assertions 
made by many critics of realism: that 
the nation state was in decline and that 
the international system was on the 
verge of an historical shift. But, unlike 
them, Huntington did not see this shift 
as the harbinger of a new era of peace 
nor did he see a decisive role for trans-
national organizations or international 
institutions. States might be in decline, 
but conflict in the international system 
would continue, driven by clashes of 
«civilizations.» The realist understand-
ing of international politics would re-
main relevant, therefore, as a necessary 
guide to prediction and policy. 
The Clash of Civilizations opens 
with description of the two thousand 
people who demonstrated in Sarajevo 
in 1994, «waving the flags of Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey,» which showed, 
Huntington says, that they identified 
themselves with their «real friends,» 
their fellow Muslims. That same year, 
70,000 people marched in the streets of 
Los Angeles, «beneath a sea of Mexican 
flags.» Huntington saw these bits of 
evidence as support for his thesis that 
cultural identity is what is «most mean-
ingful to people» in the post-Cold War 
world. However, this development was 
far from benign, for peoples «seeking 
identity and reinventing ethnicity» need 
«enemies.» Therefore, the emerging 
multipolar, multicultural world will not 
be a world of peace, as «euphoric» ide-
alists were predicting, but one in which 
the growing awareness of cultural 
identities and new sources of economic 
and military power would mix with 
old anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
resentments to produce competition 
and conflict. The relative decline of 
US power and the cultural hostility to 
democracy of the most rapidly rising 
civilizations presents a threat to US 
interests that must be recognized and 
managed. 
 Adapting Henry Kissinger’s pre-
diction that the 21st century would 
«contain at least six major powers—the 
United States, Europe, China, Japan, 
Russia and probably India,» Hunting-
ton observed that these countries repre-
sented five different civilizations. Those 
who think of the post-Cold War in 
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terms of rich and poor, East and West, 
or North and South are missing the 
most important trend, he maintained: 
the emergence of a world of competing 
civilizations. He identified them, in ad-
dition to the West, as «Islamic, Sinic, 
Hindu, Orthodox. Buddhist, Japanese, 
Latin American, and African,» adding 
Islam because countries within this 
cultural group were experiencing rapid 
demographic growth and several con-
trolled important oil resources. 
Civilizations are «totalities,» Hun-
tington asserts, distinguished by «blood, 
language, religion, and way of life,» 
values people are willing to fight and 
die for. Ethnic conflicts and failed states 
are not evidence that the world is falling 
into chaos, Huntington maintains. The 
world does not lack order because «cul-
tural assertion» is actually a force for 
integration. Nation states will continue 
to play important roles, but their «in-
terests, associations and conflicts» will 
increasingly be shaped by «cultural and 
civilizational factors.» However, Hun-
tington argues, the «balance of power» 
among civilizations is shifting. As the 
West is losing relative influence, «Asian 
civilizations are expanding their eco-
nomic, military and political strengths; 
Islam is exploding demographically…
and non-Western civilizations generally 
are reaffirming the value of their own 
culture.» The world is increasingly 
divided between «a Western one» and 
a «non-Western many,» between the 
«West and the rest.»
To support his case, Huntington 
assembles several different arguments. 
We have not reached the «end of 
history» because we are not moving 
toward «convergence» on a set of 
universal values or institutions. Those 
who think so are confusing moderniza-
tion with Westernization. Some more 
«instrumental» cultures, like those of 
Japan and India, «moved earlier and 
more easily into modernization,» while 
Confucian and Islamic societies, with 
more «consummatory» values, have 
lagged behind. This does not mean that 
Confucian and Islamic societies will be 
unable to modernize, but it does mean 
that they are likely to modernize in 
ways that are hostile to the West. 
Because identity politics defines 
itself against those it excludes, and be-
cause cultural differences, once clearly 
defined and fought for, are much more 
difficult to compromise about than 
economic differences, future conflicts 
are likely to be violent. Countries with 
populations divided between two or 
more civilizations are «torn» countries, 
likely to experience deep internal divi-
sions. Russia is an example; despite 
its long term relationship to Europe, 
«seven of eight …distinctive features 
of Western civilization—religion, lan-
guages, separation of church and state, 
rule of law, social pluralism, repre-
sentative bodies, individualism—[are] 
almost totally absent from the Russian 
experience.» If Russia became Western, 
Orthodox civilization would «cease to 
exist.» Turkey and Mexico are also ex-
amples of «torn» countries that remain 
culturally schizophrenic and therefore 
potentially unstable. 
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In what Huntington terms an ironic 
twist, modernization has brought about 
a resurgence of religion. «People do not 
live by reason alone. They cannot calcu-
late and act rationally in pursuit of their 
self interest until they define their self. 
Interest politics presupposes identity….
For people facing the need to determine 
Who am I? Where do I belong? religion 
provides compelling answers.» But this 
trend is also worrisome, as the revival 
of non-Western religions is «the most 
powerful manifestation of anti-Wester-
nism in non-Western societies.» 
Huntington analyzes the ways in 
which civilizational politics are becom-
ing evident in the international system. 
Many of his examples reinforce his 
prediction that a Confucian-Islamic 
alliance is likely to form against the 
West. Asian and Muslim countries have 
been most intent on developing nuclear 
weapons, and the «buckle» of the arms 
connection links «China and North 
Korea on the one hand, and Pakistan 
and Iran on the other.» As he argued 
in The Third Wave, Huntington fears 
that cultural factors will undermine 
democracy in Russia and the Orthodox 
republics and thinks the prospects for 
democracy in the Muslim republics are 
«weak.» He wryly observes that the 
West is facing a new «democratic para-
dox.» In the past, United States felt it 
had to support authoritarian dictators 
to defend capitalism and democracy 
against the Soviet challenge. Now the 
West has to decide whether to support 
a secular, Western-oriented «tyrant» 
or continue to push for democracy, 
knowing that democratic elections in 
Muslim countries are likely to produce 
Islamic leaders hostile to the West. The 
response to this has been an unfortu-
nate weakening of Western support for 
democracy as the Third Wave ebbs.
Avoiding war requires that «world 
leaders accept and cooperate to main-
tain the multicivilizational character of 
global politics,» Huntington counsels, 
but he also urges that Westerners ac-
cept their civilization as «unique» and 
«nonuniversal,» and unite «to renew 
and preserve it against challenges from 
non-Western societies.» Diaspora pop-
ulations will make this increasingly dif-
ficult, Huntington predicts. He warns 
that the futures of the United States and 
the West depend on «rejecting the siren 
calls of multiculturalism» domestically, 
and internationally, on resisting the 
«elusive and illusory calls to identify the 
United States with Asia.» Core states 
will need to «refrain from intervening 
in conflicts in other civilizations» and 
be ready to negotiate with each other 
so that wars along «fault lines» do not 
escalate. The principal international 
institutions created after WWII reflect 
Western «interests, values, and practic-
es,» and the West must accept reforms 
that recognize the interests of other core 
states, for example, by expanding the 
membership of the Security Council.
Huntington’s conclusion draws 
on both his realism and his cultural 
analysis. It is possible to find ways 
to mitigate the coming conflicts, he 
proposes, because, in a world of civi-
lizations, all those who have a stake 
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in civilization will oppose violence. 
Drawing on James Kurth’s observa-
tion that the «real clash» in the United 
States in the 1960s was between «the 
multiculturalists» and «the defenders 
of Western civilization,» Huntington 
suggests a parallel. The «real clash» 
in the coming world will be the clash 
«between Civilization and barbarism,» 
he argues. Therefore, the leaders of the 
world’s «great civilizations, with their 
rich accomplishments in religion, art, 
literature, philosophy, science, technol-
ogy, morality and compassion,» must 
seek common ground: they must «hang 
together, or hang separately.» Civiliza-
tional conflict is now the greatest threat 
to world peace, but «an international 
order based on civilizations is the surest 
safeguard against world war.» 
In his final book, Who Are We? 
The Challenges to America’s National 
Identity (2004), Huntington once 
more identified important questions, 
marshaled provocative data and argu-
ments and stimulated wide discussion, 
but this time his contribution was more 
problematic. 
Who Are We? explores what quali-
ties make the United States distinct and 
attractive, and thus comprise America’s 
identity, and asks whether and how 
these qualities can be preserved in new 
historical circumstances very different 
from those in which U.S. identity was 
originally forged. For three centuries, 
Huntington argues, the United States 
demonstrated an exceptional capacity 
to incorporate people of diverse back-
grounds and win their allegiance to a 
core set of political values, institutions 
and practices that have been central to 
America’s unity, power, prosperity and 
international leadership. Huntington 
succinctly analyzed when and how 
America’s core values and cultural iden-
tity emerged, and how these were rein-
forced over its history. But historically 
all societies have faced threats to their 
distinct qualities, Huntington reminds 
us. He asks whether U.S. identity today 
is still strong enough to withstand the 
loss of major external challenges; the 
emergence of multiculturalism; the ero-
sion of national loyalty by intellectual, 
political and business elites who are 
increasingly engaged in transnational 
and subnational communities; and 
the growth of a very large immigrant 
population from neighboring Mexico, 
with special characteristics that might 
cause greater resistance to assimilation 
and incorporation than had marked 
previous waves of immigration.
The sheer size of the flow of Mexi-
can immigrants, Huntington suggested, 
raised potential problems for their 
assimilation into U.S. society. These 
problems could be exacerbated by the 
comparatively low educational level of 
Mexican immigrants; their relatively 
slow rates of political naturalization 
and socioeconomic advance; and the 
understandable resentment by the host 
population of the costs of incorporat-
ing large numbers of poor and unedu-
cated Mexican immigrants into already 
over-burdened educational and social-
welfare systems. These concerns are not 
fairly dismissed as racist, as some of 
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Huntington’s detractors claimed; they 
need to be addressed as high-priority 
issues for U.S. public policy.
Huntington did not contribute 
positively to this consideration, how-
ever. Instead, he leapt from a cogent 
discussion of the unquestionably special 
nature of Mexican immigration to a 
parade of disturbing scenarios, jump-
ing at several turns from considering 
a remote prospect for societal bifurca-
tion to describing what he seemed to 
be projecting as an imminent threat. 
Huntington’s correct statements that 
much of the United States was once 
part of Mexico, and that some Mexi-
can Americans argue that the time of 
reconquista has arrived, gives way 
to an unwarranted projection that 
there could be a «consolidation of the 
Mexican-dominant areas into an au-
tonomous, culturally and linguistically 
distinct, economically self-reliant bloc 
within the United States,» and even a 
«move to reunite these territories with 
Mexico.» 
Similarly, Huntington emphasized 
worrisome data on educational and 
economic lags by Mexican immigrants 
while ignoring considerable contrary 
data showing progress on both fronts. 
Citing bits of anecdotal evidence that 
Mexican immigrants reject American 
identity, Huntington asserted that 
«as their numbers increase, Mexican 
Americans feel increasingly comfort-
able with their own culture, and often 
contemptuous of American culture.» 
But he disregarded extensive survey 
data showing that Mexican immigrants 
actually admire the rule of law and 
rewards for hard work so often lack-
ing in Mexico. Far from rejecting the 
values of the United States, Mexican 
Americans are actually more likely 
than non-Hispanic whites to embrace 
core American tenets of individualism 
and patriotism. Huntington worried 
that Mexican immigrants could easily 
be mobilized to support Mexican poli-
cies against the interests of the United 
States. But available data show that 
to the modest extent that U.S. Latino 
communities affect U.S. foreign policy, 
their main impact has been to support 
and advance mainstream U.S. foreign 
policy goals: to strengthen democracy 
and promote international trade and 
investment.
Huntington’s most widely-discussed 
conclusion in Who Are We? was that 
«the continuation of high levels of 
Mexican and Hispanic immigration 
plus the low rates of assimilation into 
American society and culture could 
eventually change America into a coun-
try of two languages, two cultures and 
two peoples.» Only gross exaggeration 
of probability at various points in the 
argument and consistent dismissal of 
contrary evidence could have led Hun-
tington to this disturbing conclusion. In 
the end, therefore, Huntington’s final 
volume fostered distracting polemics 
more than constructive dialogue about 
real policy challenges that the United 
States must face. 
What caused Huntington in his 70s 
to turn from careful and dispassionate 
analysis to such exaggeration and po-
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lemic? As if to preempt this question, 
Huntington writes in his Foreword 
that his book is shaped by his own 
dual identities «as a patriot and a 
scholar,» and admits that the «motives 
of patriotism and of scholarship may 
conflict.» He warns readers that his 
«selection and presentation of evidence 
may well be influenced by a patriotic 
desire to find meaning and virtue in 
America’s past and in its possible fu-
ture.» Huntington was clearly aware of 
and struggling with a tension between 
these competing imperatives, but was 
unable to resolve them convincingly. 
Interestingly, in The Politics of Dis-
harmony he had recognized that «the 
broader and longer-term impact of the 
Latin immigration of the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s could reinforce the central 
role of the American Creed both as a 
way of legitimizing claims to political, 
economic, and social equality and also 
as the indispensable element in defin-
ing national identity.» He speculated 
then that «at some point, traditional 
American ideals [might] lose their ap-
peal,» but he expressed doubt that this 
would happen in the twentieth century. 
Whether what made Huntington more 
concerned about this possibility in the 
21st century arose mainly from changes 
in American society or rather within 
Huntington’s psyche is a matter for 
conjecture.
Assessing Samuel 
Huntington’s contribution 
From the very start of his career 
to its end, Huntington’s work was 
controversial. Huntington was often 
denounced, sometimes for actual or im-
puted policy positions, and sometimes 
for the policy positions others took 
invoking his arguments, but almost 
always on ideological grounds. 
Much of the controversy centered on 
his alleged bias toward authoritarianism. 
This was the initial attack of colleagues at 
Harvard and others on The Soldier and 
the State, in which Huntington contrasted 
the U.S. military academy at West Point, 
with an adjacent civilian community, 
Highland Falls, describing West Point as 
«ordered serenity» and «a bit of Sparta 
in the midst of Babylon.» It was also the 
fundamental critique some offered of 
Political Order in Changing Societies, 
with its provocative opening paragraphs 
and consistent concern with authority 
and order. That Huntington could see 
and advocate the virtues, in develop-
ing countries, of one party dominant 
systems, modernizing military regimes 
and even Leninist approaches made his 
work anathema to many, while his strong 
emphasis on order as a prerequisite to 
liberty provoked comparisons to Hobbes, 
not intended as complimentary. Nor did 
his view that it is actually easier to be a 
revolutionary than a reformer, but that 
reform is needed, make him popular or 
influential among those, in Latin America 
and elsewhere, who thought revolution-
ary change was necessary. 
122
Estudios Internacionales 162 (2009) • Universidad de Chile
In fairness, however, Huntington 
was not calling for militarism or 
military rule in Soldier and the State; 
his argument, on the contrary, was 
for a professional military institution 
with conservative and realist values to 
protect a liberal society, which would 
require institutionalizing «objective» 
and «subjective» civilian control of the 
armed forces. And his argument in Po-
litical Order was certainly not in favor 
of dictatorial regimes but rather for 
the crucial importance of constructing 
authority and establishing civic order 
as a necessary first step toward mak-
ing possible the conditions of liberty. 
Those who have lived or worked in 
«praetorian» societies, where social 
mobilization and rising claims for par-
ticipation greatly exceed the capacity of 
political institutions to process expand-
ing demands, appreciate Huntington’s 
central argument, which has not lost its 
cogency despite the dramatic changes 
that have taken place in the forty 
years since he wrote. In many nations, 
including Iraq, Haiti and Afghanistan, 
but also several countries (or regions 
within countries) in Latin America and 
in Africa, it is clear that a minimal level 
of state capacity can neither be taken 
for granted nor easily achieved, and 
that building this capacity is the first 
priority.
The Third Wave demonstrates 
Huntington’s normative preference 
for effective democratic governance, 
including the limits on power that are 
needed once authority has been con-
structed. But it is consistent with Politi-
cal Order in identifying both economic 
development and effective political 
institutions as critical to democratic 
success. It also introduces a new theme, 
not emphasized in Political Order, that 
would become increasingly dominant in 
Huntington’s writing—the importance 
of culture and the need to defend West-
ern values. Even before he published 
his article on the clash of civilizations 
in 1993, Huntington had begun to 
differentiate the «institutionalization» 
that occurs in countries of the West 
from potentially competitive patterns 
of modernization and institutionaliza-
tion occurring within other cultural 
traditions, such as China’s economic 
success and the political order promised 
by radical Islam. 
To reread Huntington’s work is to 
become immersed once again in the 
difficult and often polarizing debates 
over US domestic policies and its in-
ternational role that have occurred 
over the last forty years. To those, 
Huntington brought a command of 
comparative politics that was un-
matched in its global scope and its eye 
for telling examples. He brought superb 
analytical and writing skills to the 
task of clarifying the major issues and 
drawing out their policy implications. 
Huntington took on the scholarly fads 
of the day, upending modernization 
theory in Political Order in Changing 
Societies and challenging the polarized 
interpretations of the 1960s in The 
Promise of Disharmony. Clash of Civi-
lizations offered an alternative to both 
the optimism of Francis Fukuyama’s 
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«End of History» and the pessimism 
of Robert Kaplan’s «Coming Anarchy,» 
and it is a measure of his stature that 
both these scholars, and many others, 
count themselves among his admirers. 
In all cases, his style was to surround 
his opponent’s arguments with his own, 
eventually depriving them of oxygen, 
rather than engaging in frontal or ad 
hominem attacks. He was a brilliant 
advocate of his views, but not a flashy 
polemicist. 
There are issues one wishes Hun-
tington had explored more fully and 
contradictions one wishes he had ad-
dressed. Huntington recognized the 
critical importance both of economic 
growth and social equity, but he did 
not much discuss the institutions and 
policies necessary to achieve them nor 
the effect of US insistence (from the 
early 1980s to the present) on pro-
market policies that arguably widened 
income inequalities and weakened state 
capacity. Development and welfare are 
elements of democratic performance to 
which he attached less importance than 
to cultural habits or political choices 
in predicting the staying power of de-
mocracies. Huntington’s concern that 
the West unite to preserve the values 
of liberalism did not address the con-
flict between the libertarian elements 
of the American Creed and the social 
democratic values shared by much 
of «the rest of the West.» By making 
«core countries» the chief actors in the 
world he imagines in Clash of Civiliza-
tions, Huntington reasserted the realist 
paradigm of great power politics too 
unconditionally, taking inadequate ac-
count of globalization, transnational 
organizations, and the rise of civil so-
ciety and their relation to democratic 
sustainability. 
Yet unlike many contemporary 
theorists of international relations (and 
policy makers intent on using US «uni-
polar» power to further democracy), 
Huntington was a consistent realist, 
aware of Machiavelli’s insight that 
human actions have unintended con-
sequences, and knowing that actions 
taken on high moral grounds can have 
high moral costs. He did not foresee an 
end to the ethical and practical dilem-
mas, nor to the dangers, but also the 
promise, of politics. His commitment 
to clear and balanced thinking and to 
prudent action, and his willingness to 
challenge the clichés of the left and the 
right, will be sorely missed. 
A final personal comment by 
Abe Lowenthal
I was one of Huntington’s doctoral 
students, assisted in his undergraduate 
course, worked closely with him on the 
Commission on U.S.-Latin American 
relations and traveled with Sam on 
what was for both of us a memorable 
first trip to Cuba in 1975. 
Sam Huntington was unassuming 
and even diffident— except when his 
ideas were directly challenged. Al-
though a master craftsman of exposi-
tory written prose, Huntington was not 
an exceptional public speaker, and was 
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unintimidating in the classroom and in 
examinations. People who knew him 
first through his robust and forceful 
writings were often surprised by his 
personal demeanor. What I most clearly 
remember about Sam was the alert and 
somewhat skeptical expression on his 
face as he listened to colleagues or stu-
dents, and the shy smile of assent as he 
acknowledged a good point.
Huntington clearly loved teaching 
and wanted students to succeed; he 
was glad to offer good advice, solicited 
or not. He was quick to recognize and 
encourage new talent. He devoted the 
longest footnote in Political Order in 
Changing Societies to an unpublished 
graduate student paper of mine and put 
my first published essay on the syllabus 
for his undergraduate lecture course—
vivid examples of how he nurtured 
those at the start of new careers.
Two vignettes from our Cuba trip 
illustrate Huntington’s acuity. When we 
met with Blas Roca, the drafter of the 
new Cuban constitution adopted under 
Fidel Castro, Huntington turned to 
Roca, acknowledged that he had never 
previously been in Cuba nor traveled 
much in Latin America but allowed 
that he had read many constitutions. 
He then offered the observation that the 
new constitution provided a number of 
checks on the power of government, 
but not on the power of the Commu-
nist Party, «which is where real power 
probably resides.» Roca, taken aback, 
agreed!
The next day, Cuban officials from 
Prensa Latina (a mixture of press 
agency and intelligence service) told us 
with enthusiasm about the novel and 
progressive approach of Peru’s «Revo-
lutionary Government of the Armed 
Forces» under General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado, with its goal of establishing 
a «social democracy of full participa-
tion.» Huntington noted that what 
the Cubans were telling us with such 
evident conviction could not actually 
be true because it contradicted the es-
sential organizational principles of a 
military institution. Scores of articles 
and books were written about «The 
Peruvian Experiment;» Huntington’s 
quip caught one of the most important 
points in an instant.
Afflicted with diabetes from age 20, 
Sam Huntington lived with multiple 
daily reminders of his frail health. He 
sometimes experienced frightening 
episodes, once in my presence. He over-
came these serious problems by apply-
ing to his daily life the kind of quiet but 
effective discipline that characterized his 
scholarship. He deeply understood life’s 
promise and its limits. He recognized 
man’s capacity both for community 
and for selfishness, the human quali-
ties, as Reinhold Niebuhr emphasized, 
that make democracy both possible and 
necessary. Profound awareness of both 
these qualities shaped Samuel P. Hun-
tington’s scholarship and undergirds his 
enduring contribution.
